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Abstract
We analyze the impact of unemployment benefits and minimum wages us-
ing an equilibrium search model which allows for dispersion of benefits and
productivity levels, job-to-job transitions, and structural and frictional un-
employment. The estimation method uses readily available aggregate data
on marginal distributions of unemployment durations as well as wages and
benefit levels. Different causes of structural and frictional unemployment
are investigated. We investigate the efficiency of the imposition of a sin-
gle benefit level for all household types and the introduction of an Earned
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1 Introduction
Unemployment benefits and minimum wages are important determinants of the
distributions of unemployment durations and wages. There have been many stud-
ies on the effectiveness of benefits and minimum wages as policy tools to influence
unemployment (see references below). In this study we develop and apply a novel
approach to the empirical analysis of the effects of changes in benefits and mini-
mum wages. This approach is attractive for a number of reasons, notably (1) it
is based on a structural model of optimal decision making of individual agents,
(2) the model is an equilibrium model of the labor market, (3) it allows for the
simultaneous analysis of changes in benefits and minimum wages, and (4) it only
requires readily available aggregate data.
The economic model is a model of labor markets with imperfect information,
where workers and employers search optimally for a suitable match. Such models
are well-adapted to explain unemployment durations and wages (see surveys by
Mortensen, 1986, and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999) and they allow for non-
trivial effects of minimum wages and benefits. To explain the advantages of our
model and empirical approach, it is useful to briefly summarize the empirical
literature on equilibrium labor market search to date. By now, the empirical
analysis of partial search models, which focus on worker behavior and treat the
wage offer distribution as given, is widespread. Such models are able to explain
many stylized facts (see e.g. surveys by Devine and Kiefer, 1991, Layard, Nick-
ell and Jackman,  1991, and Wolpin, 1995). However, a number of important
issues can not be analyzed with these partial models. This of course includes
all research issues related to wage determination, employer behavior, interaction
between worker and employer behavior, and the effects of policies that directly or
indirectly affect wages. All of the latter issues are potentially of great importance
for the analysis of the lower end of the labor market and for policy analysis of
benefits and minimum wage effects. For instance, an important question as the
effect of unemployment benefits on job search by the unemployed cannot be an-
swered satisfactorily without allowing for the possibility that employers respond
to changes in the behavior of job seekers.
In response to these disadvantages, equilibrium search models have been de-
veloped in which the employers’ decision problem is explicitly incorporated. Dia-
mond (1971) shows that, in an economy where both workers and firms are homo-
geneous, with no possibility for workers to search while employed, the resulting
equilibrium wage distribution is a mass point at the wage prevailing if labor de-
mand is monopolized (which is the workers’ opportunity cost of employment).
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In the general case, equilibrium wage offers must equal the reservation wage of
some (group of) worker(s). Intuitively, this is because otherwise a firm can re-
duce its wage offer without loss of potential workers. Thus, a model in which
potential workers of a firm differ in their reservation wage values may generate
wage dispersion.
Recently, the theoretical and empirical literature on equilibrium search has
made substantial progress (see Ridder and Van den Berg, 1997, for an overview).
The recent literature takes the theoretical framework developed by Mortensen
(1990) and Burdett and Mortensen (1998) as points of departure. In this frarne-
work, ex ante identical workers are allowed to search for other jobs while working.
A firm that sets a high wage is then able to attract workers from firms offering
lower wages. So, if individuals work at different wages then, from the point of
view of an employer, the labor supply curve is upward sloping, and there is a
trade-off between the wage and the labor force of the firm, which in turn gener-
ates equilibrium wage dispersion. In the case of homogeneous workers and firms,
the equilibrium wage density is increasing, which is at odds with the data. There-
fore, to be able to fit wage data, it is necessary to account for heterogeneity. Van
den Berg and Ridder (1998) deal with this by assuming that the labor market is
segmented and consists of a large number of separate different submarkets within
( which workers and employers are homogeneous. Here, the productivity level can
be interpreted as the worker-specific skill level. This model is well able to explain
wage data. Moreover, it allows for structural unemployment: if the minimum
wage or the opportunity cost of employment exceeds the productivity level of a
segment then all workers attached to that segment become permanently unem-
ployed (or non-participant). However, the policy effects on unemployment within
a single segment or market are trivial, in this model as well as in the Diamond
(1971) model and the homogeneous Burdett-Mortensen (1998) model, as well as
in model extensions with heterogeneous firms within a market (Bontemps, Robin
and Van den Berg, 2000). All unemployed workers accept all job offers all the
time. If the common minimum wage or benefits level increases, then the wage
distribution shifts towards higher wages, and unemployment does not change.
This is restrictive; for example, concerning minimum wage effects, there is no
consensus on their size and magnitude. In addition, these models do not explain
negative duration dependence of the aggregate exit rate out of unemployment,
which is an important stylized fact, and they do not allow individuals within the
same market to have different benefits levels.
This obviously calls for heterogeneity of unemployed workers’ benefits levels
within a market. Mortensen (1990),  Burdett and Mortensen (1998) and Bon-
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temps, Robin and Van den Berg (1999) examine this model extension. Hetero-
geneity in benefits levels implies that workers with high benefits levels reject some
job offers, so that a part of the frictional unemployment is due to workers’ se-
lectivity. Moreover, the policy effects are non-trivial, and the aggregate exit rate
out of unemployment displays negative duration dependence.
In this paper we adopt the model framework developed by Van den Berg and
Ridder (1998) ( see also Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg, 1995),  and we extend
this with benefits heterogeneity. That is, we assume that the labor market is
segmented and consists of a large number of separate different submarkets within
which workers have the same productivity but possibly different benefits levels.
Different segments have different productivity levels. From the above it follows
that this model allows for frictional and structural unemployment, it can be
expected to give a good fit to data on wages and unemployment durations, and
it does not impose trivial policy effects.
Since we allow for unemployment benefits dispersion and we intend to exam-
ine counterfactual benefits distributions, we have to be specific about the benefits
system and the determinants of the individual benefits level. Over the years the
unemployment benefits system has become a complicated system of income pro-
tection for workers who have lost their job. Its core is the unemployment insur-
ance system that was introduced after World War II. Unemployment insurance
benefits protect workers, in particular workers with insufficient savings, during
their search for a new job. Without this protection workers would be forced to
accept jobs at a much lower wage than they earned in their last job. In the wage
posting model that is the basis for our empirical work, unemployment insurance
benefits increase the correlation between the wage in the new job and the value
of the (marginal) product of the worker.
The unemployment insurance systems differ considerably between countries.
The main differences are in the requirements for eligibility, the duration of ben-
efits, and the replacement rate, i.e. the ratio of the benefits to income in the job
that was lost. In most countries these benefits support job search up to a year.
The replacement rate is at most 70% of previous income, but in many cases much
lower. In some countries the replacement rates are needs based, being higher for
couples with a single earner. In most countries unemployment insurance benefits
are supplemented by other types of benefits. Many countries have unemployment
assistance benefits for unemployed who exhaust their unemployment insurance
benefits. These are usually not a fraction of previous income and often means
tested. Often supplements are paid to single-earner households and/or house-
holds with children and this increases the replacement rates for these households.
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In some countries the supplements are paid as housing benefits. An additional
complication is that some countries also have a social assistance program that
supports individuals and households that do not qualify for unemployment insur-
ance or assistance benefits, and social assistance benefits usually act as a lower
bound on unemployment benefits.
This complicated system of income protection for the unemployed leads to
a substantial variation in replacement rates between types of households, but
surprisingly not between countries (with a few exceptions) and over the duration
of the spell of unemployment. In a comparison of 18 countries, the OECD found
that at the average wage, unemployment insurance benefits replaced on average
52% of previous gross earnings, irrespective of household type (OECD, 1997).
The net (of tax) replacement rates including supplemental benefits for a couple
with children was on average 73% in the first month of unemployment and 67%
after 5 years of unemployment. ’ The decline in the replacement rate during
the unemployment spell is larger for couples without children and single-person
households, but smaller for couples with children who earned a wage below the
average.
We conclude that (i) although the unemployment insurance benefits decline
during the spell of unemployment, the supplemental benefits make this decline
less pronounced, and (ii) replacement rates differ between household types. In
fact, we will assume that, for a given household type, the unemployment income
is essentially constant during the spell of unemployment. Van den Berg (1990)
shows that it is optimal for unemployed workers to anticipate future declines of
the benefits level by reducing the reservation wage before the actual decline. As
a result, the optimal reservation wage path declines less than might be expected
on the basis of the magnitude of the benefits declines. The reservation wage is
generally close to the constant reservation wage level in a stationary model where
the benefits level is an average of the actual successive levels during a spell.
In principle, it would be preferable to incorporate any benefits declines into
the equilibrium model. Due to their complexity, such models have not been
analyzed in the literature. The path of the optimal reservation wage follows a
differential equation that cannot be solved analytically except for special func-
tional forms for the wage offer distribution. The labor supply of a firm at a
given point of time is affected by the cross-sectional distribution of reservation
wages across unemployed individuals who are at different stages of their spells.
It is not clear what the equilibrium properties are. PerhapsI
,
from a computational point of view, the empirical analysis of
lThe  exception is Italy with a 11% replacement rate after 5 years.
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more importantly,
such models seems
extremely complicated.
We should note that in general a constant benefits level does not correspond
to the socially optimal outcome. For example, in the context of a frictional labor
market, Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997) show that an optimal benefits system
entails that benefits decline during unemployment. However, investigations of
the effects of decreasing benefits and the socially optimal system are beyond the
scope of this paper.
In our empirical work we take account of the variation of benefits between
household types. In many countries the unemployment insurance (but not the
unemployment or social assistance) benefits are related to the income in the last
job. This provides a second source of variation in unemployment benefits. In our
model we ignore this type of variation. In developing our model we shall argue
that this variation may influence wage setting at higher wages. However, we
want to concentrate on the lower end of the labor market where the disincentive
effects of the benefits system are more important. To avoid biases, we estimate
the model for a country, the UK, in which the insurance benefits are not related
to previous earnings.
The high replacement rates for particular types of households have led to con-
cern that work is hardly attractive to members of such households. Such house-
holds are caught in an unemployment trap, which may translate into a poverty
trap. An important contribution of this paper is to quantify this unemployment
trap. It is important to do this in an equilibrium model of the labor market,
because this allows us to distinguish between the case that job seekers turn down
offers and the case that it is not profitable for firms to employ workers at their
reservation wage. The unemployment trap refers to the first case, because in the
latter the unemployed do not receive any job offers. If this case applies, the jobs
“just are not there”, as often stated by frustrated job seekers.
A policy intervention that makes work more attractive is the introduction of
benefits that are conditional on employment. Examples are the Earned Income
Tax Credit in the US and the Family Credit in the UK. As we shall show, in
a wage posting model these benefits have the same effect as a reduction in the
unemployment benefits. In our empirical work, we shall estimate the effect of
the Family Credit on labor market outcomes, taking account of the responses
of employers. Hence, our work supplements earlier studies of the FC that only
considered labor supply responses (Scholz,  1996). When the FC was introduced
some critics expressed concern that it would be an implicit wage subsidy to low-
wage employers (OECD, 1997). We shall quantify this effect.
Full estimation of equilibrium search models with longitudinal labor force sur-
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vey data is a non-trivial task and requires data of high quality covering long time
spans, as is obvious from the empirical studies above. Such data are not readily
available for every country. In this paper we show that the structural model
parameters can be estimated from aggregate data that are obtained from yearly
cross-sectional surveys (such as the US Current Population Survey (CPS) and the
EC Labor Force Surveys (LFS); these aggregate data are obtained from readily
available OECD and EUROSTAT  publications). This may come as a surprise,
since equilibrium search models deal with interrelations between duration and
wage variables, while aggregate data only contain information on the marginal
distributions of wages, benefits, and durations.
Estimation with readily available aggregate data is useful if longitudinal mi-
cro data are not available or if the scope of a study does not allow estimation
with micro data. The approach is therefore particularly useful for cross-national
comparisons. Moreover, given the high requirements of the quality of longitudi-
nal micro data and the relatively small number of observations and high attrition
rate in most of those data, estimates from aggregate data derived from repeated
cross-sections provide a useful comparison.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical
model. Section 3 describes the institutional aspects of the benefits and income
’ tax system, and it discusses the data. The empirical implementation is discussed
in section 4 and the estimation results are in section 5. Section 6 discusses the
policy evaluations of our paper. Finally, section 7 summarizes our main findings,
2 The equilibrium search model
2.1 Submarkets
We assume that the labor market can be segmented into a large number, to be
precise a continuum, of submarkets. In a submarket workers with a common
productivity, i.e. a common marginal value product, denoted by p interact with
firms that are identical, except for the size of their workforce. The distribution
of productivity levels over the submarkets is given by the cdf I’. We assume that
workers and firms can not move between segments. Hence, we may think of 13
as an endowment, e.g. related to specific skills of workers that are required by a
specific group of firms or the level of productivity at a particular location where
a group of workers and firms are stuck, and not as a characteristic that can be
changed by investment by either the worker, e.g. in schooling,  or the firm, e.g.
in capital goods. Alternatively, we may think of p as a characteristic that can
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be changed by investment. In that case, we assume that all investment decisions
have been made, and no further investment takes place. In our empirical work,
we do not relate p to observed characteristics of workers and/or firms, so that
the distinction is moot.
2 .2  Workers
Every worker in a particular submarket is either unemployed or employed. If
unemployed he or she receives unemployment benefits that depend on the type of
household that he or she belongs to. Household types are denoted by h = 1,. . . , H
and the unemployment benefits of a worker in household type h is denoted by
bh. The income tax rate also depends on h and bh  is the after-tax benefits. The
household type only affects the unemployment benefits and the income tax rate
and is not related to any other characteristic of the worker or firm as used in the
model. In particular, we assume that the distribution of p is the same for workers
belonging to different household types. If the total mass of workers is normalized
to 1, then mh,  h =  1,. . . , H is the fraction of workers who belong to household
type h. Without loss of generality we order household types by increasing net
benefits.
Jobs arrive according to a Poisson process, with arrival rate A,  which is the
same for employed and unemployed workers. The assumption that the job offer
arrival rate is the same in employment and unemployment deserves some discus-
sion. If we relax this assumption then the model becomes intract able, because
then the unemployed workers’ reservation wages depend on all structural deter-
minants (see Mortensen, 1990). Moreover, the currently available aggregate data
are often not informative on the job offer arrival rate of the employed (Ridder
and Van den Berg, 1999). Of course, the assumption we make is restrictive.
Other empirical studies based on equilibrium search models either find that the
arrival rates are of similar magnitude (see e.g. Van den Berg and Ridder, 1998)
or find that the arrival rate of job offers to employees is an order of magnitude
smaller than that of unemployed job searchers (Kiefer and Neumann, 1993, and
Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg, 2000). The only other studies in which equi-
librium search models with benefits dispersion have ever been estimated assume
either that employed workers receive offers at the same rate as the unemployed
(Bontemps, Robin and Van den Berg, 1999) or that they do not receive alterna-
tive offers (Eckstein and Wolpin, 1990). The latter model does not fit the wage
data well.
Employed workers become unemployed at a separation rate 6. In the remain-
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der of this paper, we write K; to represent the ratio X/6. This parameter can be
interpreted as the average number of job offers during a spell of employment.
Workers maximize their expected future wealth, discounted at a rate p.
When a job is offered to a worker, this worker has to decide whether to
accept or reject the job. Since jobs have just one characteristic, the wage level,
the optimal strategy depends only on that level and it has the reservation wage
property. If there are no job mobility costs, the reservation wage of employed
individuals is equal to the wage in their current job. Because the offer arrival
rate of an unemployed worker remains the same if he or she accepts a job, the
after-tax reservation wage is equal to the after-tax unemployment benefits. The
computation of the before-tax reservation wage is complicated by employment-
conditional benefits as the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) in the US and the
Family Credit (FC) in the UK. These are determined by the net income in the
job. If the reservation wage is denoted by [h,  then the net reservation wage is
equal to [h - oh  (Jh)th  with oh  the tax schedule. The corresponding tax credit is
denoted by dh.  The net income in the job is the sum of these components, and
this is equal to net income while unemployed bh. Hence, the reservation wage is
the solution of & -  T&&  + dh  = bh.
Note that an employment-conditional tax credit is equivalent to the reduction
of the after-tax unemployment benefits by the value of the tax credit. The reser-
vation wage decreases with the tax credit and in this sense the introduction of
the credit can be seen as a painless (to the unemployed) reduction of the unem-
ployment benefits. If the marginal tax rate is less than lOO%,  then it always pays
to accept a job with a higher wage. Because in our model we do not consider the
hours decision and workers always supply either 0 or a fixed number of hours, the
behavior of employed workers is unaffected by the tax system. For that reason,
it is convenient to use before-tax quantities in the model. The only place where
the tax system plays a role is in the determination of the reservation wage of the
unemployed.
2.3 Firms
W e define WI4 as the steady-state workforce of a firm offering a gross wage
in the submarket with productivity level p. T h e grossw given that it operates
wage is the before-tax wage, but after social security contributions. The latter
is innocuous, if we interpret p as the value product after deduction of this con-
tribution An increase in this contribution shifts the distribution of p and could
lead to a higher level of structural unemployment as defined below. We do not
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consider social security contributions in the sequel. Employers are assumed to
maximize their steady-state profit flow
The employers’ optimal strategy has two stages. First, they decide whether to
participate or not and next, if they decide to participate, they make a wage offer.
We assume that the same wage must be offered to all members of the workforce of
a firm. For the moment, we assume that there is no mandatory minimum wage.
It is obvious that I(wlp) = 0, whenever w < &, i.e. below the lowest reservation
wage of the unemployed, and firms offering wages below <i do not participate in
their labor submarket. Hence, the optimal strategy is to participate if and only
if the productivity level is higher than the lowest reservation wage level. The
distribution of the wages offered in a submarket is represented by a distribution
function F(wlp).  The support of the wage offer distribution is equal to the set of
profit maximizing wages, which we denote by w(p). The infimum and supremum
of the support are denoted by w(p) and m(p).  Note that the strategy of firms is
a pure strategy if and only if F(urlp) is degenerate. The earnings distribution,
i.e. the distribution of wages earned by a cross section of workers at a point in
time, is denoted by G(zulp).
2.4 Equilibrium in a submarket
For a particular submarket, the model as described in the previous subsections,
is a special case of Mortensen’s model. We assume th
dispersion in submarkets and that the job offer arri
employed and unemployed workers. Mortensen (1990)
wage offer distribution is given by
with
.at  there is nol productivity
val rates are the same for
shows th.at  th.e  equilibrium
The density of the wage offer distribution is equal to
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f(WlP)  =
cp’(WIP) if  w  E  w(p>
o otherwise
where W(P) = (wlP(WlP)  5 P(W w < x < U(P)} and cp’(wlp)  is the derivative- -
of the function (p
Since employers, who offer a wage in an interval below the reservation wage of
a particular typ,e  of workers, are able to increase their profits by offering a wage
equal to that reservation wage, there will be no wage offers in that interval and
the density f(wlp) is 0 in an interval below the &‘s. The lowest wage offered
in a submarket depends on p. This wage is always equal to the reservation
wage of some type of worker. As shown by Mortensen, the type is given by
mg mwd,...  ) H 1 (P - h) c:=,m  .>
The steady-state equilibrium earnings distribution is
WIP)  = K Cw>&  QdPl (F(WIP) - mJP)J
--(I  + Kn4PJ)  (1 - U(P)>
where F = 1 - F and uh(p) is the equilibrium unemployment rate for type h
workers with productivity level p
(7)
And u(p) is the unemployment rate for all workers with productivity level p
H
U(P) = )--)wh(P)
h=l
(8)
By taking derivatives of equation (6),  we obtain the density of the earnings
distribution
K cw>ch  mhuh(p)f(w  lp)
g(wip) = (1 + &wlp))2(1  - u(p))
(9)
1 0
Analytical expressions can be derived for the conditional distributions F(wIp)
and G(ulIp) after tedious calculations. See the Appendix for more details.
The preceding discussion did not allow for the presence of a mandatory min-
imum wage. A few comments are in order. First, we use the notation w,in for
such a minimum wage and & := max {wmin, <h).  Second, its introduction has
the consequence that firms in a labor market segment only participate if their
productivity level is at least as high as &. Third, the new wage offer distribution
first order stochastically dominates the wage offer distribution before the intro-
duction of a minimum wage. Fourth, even if the minimum wage is binding in
the sense that g(p) < wonin before its introduction, it is possible that this mini-
mum wage is not in the support of the wage offer distribution. In that case the
introduction of the mandatory minimum wage makes the lowest wage equal to
the largest reservation wage below the minimum wage that has positive support.
Finally, the introduction of a minimum wage does not have any effect if it is
below the lowest reservation wage.
2.5 Aggregation over submarkets
The macro labor market wage offer distribution is derived by aggregation over
the distribution of p (cJ Koning, Ridder and Van den Berg, 1995)
F(w) =
s
F(wkw  (PIP L CL)
(10)
=sPEW-‘(w)
F(WlP)~~  (PIP 2 68)  + r (P(w>IP  1 r,>-
The function p(w) is the inverse of the upper bound of the support of the wage-
offer distribution w(p) seen as a function of p (analogously p(w)  is the inverse
function of the lower bound of the support g(p)). Because the cdf of the wage
offer distribution is equal to 1 if the wage exceeds this upper bound, integration
over those values of p that are consistent with a given value of w yields the second
term in the last equation. See figure 1 for an illustration. W-‘(w)  is the inverse
of the support of the wage offer distribution, i.e. those values of p for which the
wage offer density f (w I p) > 0 for a given value of w.
The aggregate wage offer density function f is given by
f0 /W = f(wlPpcPlP  1 TJ (11)
PEW-‘(P)
1 1
Figure 1: Illustration of the relationship between wages, productivity levels and
the conditional wage offer distribution
The aggregate unemployment rate is given by
mh
(12)
H
mh
The first term on the right-hand side applies to submarkets in which all offered
wages are acceptable to the unemployed. The second term refers to submarkets
where some but not all offers are acceptable to the unemployed, while the third
term is for submarkets where none of the wage offers are acceptable.
The assumption that the arrival rates are the same among transition states,
together with the finite number of household types and as a consequence the dis-
crete distribution of unemployment benefits, implies that all the submarket wage
offer distributions have intervals with zero density below the reservation wages
(that are independent of p). Hence the aggregate wage offer and earnings distri-
butions have zero density on the same intervals. This is clearly a less attractive
feature of the equilibrium distribution. We will not try to mask it by introducing
measurement error in the wages.
12
2.6 A decomposition of unemployment
It is illustrative to introduce a decomposition of the unemployment rate into
a structural and frictional part. This decomposition can be obtained by using
formula (12) of the previous subsection. First, the structural unemployment rate,
which is the third component on the right-hand side of (12),  can be decomposed
as
The first component is the structural unemployment due to a high minimum
wage. This component is equal to zero if & > wmin,  i.e. if the lowest reservation-
wage exceeds the minimum wage. The second component consists of structural
unemployment due to high reservation wages, i.e. firms with a productivity
below the reservation wage of some group of unemployed workers make offers
that are not acceptable to these workers who prefer to remain unemployed. We
denote these two components of structural unemployment by z&.* and ui. These
components are not independent: a lower minimum wage gives less unemployment
due to a high minimum wage, but more unemployment due to high reservation
wages.
The frictional component of unemployment is equal to the sum of the first
two terms on the right-hand side of (12)
1
l+K
h = l h=l
> mh (14
The first component consist of unemployment in submarkets where the unem-
ployed of various types accept all job offers. The second component corresponds
to submarkets where some of the unemployed turn down job offers.
3 Institutions and data
3.1 Unemployment benefits and income taxes
In the United Kingdom, unemployment insurance benefits are independent of
income in the last job. If the unemployed worker is eligible for UI benefits, he
or she receives these benefits for 1 year after a waiting period of 3 days. The
benefit amount depends on the household situation and is equal to 338 dollars
1 3
per month for single individuals and lone parents and equal to 547 dollars per
month for couples.
There is no unemployment assistance for unemployed who exhaust their UI
benefits. However, there is a social assistance system for all households whose
net income falls below a minimum level and whose members do not work more
than 16 hours per week (Income Szlpport). In the calculation of the benefit
amount the net income of the household from labor and other sources is taken
into account. These maximum benefits are equal to 338 dollars per month for
single individuals and 532 dollars per month for couples. Supplements are paid
for dependent children, depending on the age of the child. These supplements
vary from 116 dollars per month for a child under 11 to 268 dollars per month
for a child above 18 years of age.
In addition the household receives housing benefits that are equal to the rent
for households who are eligible for Income Support. For non-eligible households,
housing benefits are equal to the rent minus 65 percent of the difference between
net income and the maximum benefit.
Finally, family benefits are paid to households with children below 15 years of
age or below 19 if they are still in full-time non-advanced education. The benefits
are equal to 76 dollars per month for the eldest child and 62 dollars per month
’ for each additional child.
Household members are taxed individually. The marginal tax rate is progres-
sive and varies from 20 to 40 percent. An important feature of the tax system
in the United Kingdom is the existence of an earned income tax credit for adults
(Family credit). The actual payments from this in-work benefits system depend
on the number of children, the age of the children and net income. For adults
with two children (one below 11 and one between 11 and 15),  the payments are
equal to 490 dollars per month at the level of the minimum wage. This is quite
a large amount compared to the level of unemployment benefits in the United
Kingdom.
3.2 The data on unemployment durations and wages
The unemployment data are from the UK Labor Force Survey (LFS), which is
part of the EUROSTAT  LFS, and which is held every quarter. The EUROSTAT
LFS combines surveys from different EU member states and is designed to obtain
comparable labor force statistics of the different countries. It is intended to cover
all persons whose usual place of residence is in the territory of the EU. From
1992, the methods and definitions of the surveys are harmonized across countries
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(see EUROSTAT, 1996a,  for a summary). We therefore restrict attention to data
from the years 1992 to 1996. EUROSTAT  publishes the results of the surveys
in their annual report (see for example EUROSTAT, 199613). For the UK, the
annual report uses data from the Labor Force Survey of the second quarter of
the year. These are not corrected for any seasonal effects. The sample size of
the Survey differs from period to period, but is on average equal to about 60,000
households.
We use unemployment rate data from these annual EUROSTAT  reports. The
corresponding unemployment definition is based on the IL0 definition (i.e., self-
reported: without work, actively searching, and immediately available for work).
We also use the unemployment duration data from these annual reports. These
concern the elapsed durations of currently unemployed individuals. Specifically,
the durations are grouped into eight duration classes: < 1 month, 1 -  3, 3 - 6,
6 - 12, 12 -  18, 18 - 24, 24 - 48 and > 48 months, and we observe the number-
of individuals who are in a certain duration class. The duration is defined as the
minimum of the duration of search for a job and the length of the period since
the last job was held.
Data on earnings are based on the annual New Earnings Survey, provided by
the British Central Statistical Office. The survey concerns a 1% random sample
of employees in Pay As You Earn (PAYE) schemes. This gives about 180,000
records in each year of our reference period. The data that we use are grouped,
and they concern gross earnings of full-time employees. These gross earnings
equal what the worker formally earns: they include occasional payments but
exclude employer labor taxes.
The tax rates at different wage levels are obtained by using data of the OECD
(1997). These tax rates equal income taxes plus social security contributions mi-
nus benefits provided to employees, such as housing benefits and family benefits.
We take the differences between household types into account. Figure 2 illustrates
the calculated average tax rates.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics for the year 1994. As there was
no mandatory minimum wage in the UK in 1993, we use the smallest of the
minimum wages that are set by the wage councils.
Structurally unemployed individuals may be underrepresented in the unem-
ployment data. Structurally unemployed individuals will never find a job, so
they may classify themselves as a nonparticipant when being questioned on their
labor market state. Some of them may be in the disability program or in early
retirement even though they are still able and willing to work. As a result, the
unemployment rate in the data may underestimate the total unemployment rate,
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Figure 2: Average tax rates at different wage levels, in local currency
and the estimated structural unemployment may be downward biased. This prob-
( lem cannot be solved by adding all nonparticipants to the unemployed, because
the state of nonparticipation also includes individuals who do not participate by
choice, e.g. homemakers. The current data do not enable a distinction between
individuals who do not participate by choice and individuals who would partici-
pate if the wage floor were not binding. Previous empirical research found that
the group of non-participants is quite heterogeneous and these individuals differ
from the unemployed with respect to their transition rate to employment (Flinn
and Heckman,  1983, Goniil,  1992, and Jones and Riddell,  1999). We report the
UK non-participation rate in Table 1. This rate is high in comparison to other
countries. It has to be stressed that it varies across different age groups.
3.3 Construction of the unemployment benefits distribu-
tion
The benefits data provided by OECD (1997) are our starting point for the con-
struction of the distribution of b in the population. These data concern calculated
after-tax unemployment benefits for different types of households conditional on
the occasion that the head of the household receives either unemployment in-
surance or social assistance. It is important to stress that these calculations are
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Variable
Unemployment
Unemployment rate 0 . 0 9 7
Fraction with duration > 1 year 0.45
Fraction with duration > 2 years 0 . 2 7
Fraction with duration > 4 years 0.10
Wages (earnings) ’
Minimum wage in 1993 ’ 7 4 5
Mean wage in 1995 2 3 5 8
Kaitz index c 0.32
D5/Dl-ratio 1.78
DS/D5-ratio 1.86
DS/Dl-ratio 3.31
Average replacement rate in 1993 b 0.63
Marginal wedge 0.40
Non-participation
Non-participation rate, age 20-65 0.30
CLGr~~~ levels, in U.S. dollars per month. Di is the zl th decile of the earnings distribution.
%ource-  Central Planning Bureau (1995).
CThe Kaitz  index is defined as the ratio of minimum wage and average earnings, see Dolado
et al. (1996).
Table 1: Some descriptive statistics for 1994.
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basically made for every worker in the labor force, so that the averages correspond
to the average worker and not to the average currently unemployed worker. If
calculations would be based on currently unemployed workers only then correc-
tions for selectivity would have to be made to obtain the population distribution.
The benefits levels include supplementary housing and family benefits. The cal-
culations are provided for 1995. OECD (1997) distinguishes three prototypes
of households: (1) single persons, (2) lone parents with two children, and (3)
married couples with two children. Table 2 summarizes these data.
We use the EUROSTAT  LFS to translate these benefits by household level
into the benefits distribution at the individual level. Table 114 of EUROSTAT
(199613) presents numbers of private households by household type. Members of a
household who are under 15 years of age are counted as children, while members
aged above 15 are counted as adults. Hence, it is not unusual to find households
with 3 or more adults. The LFS distinguishes 5 main types of households: (1)
one person households, (2) several adults and no children (3) one adult with
children, (4) two adults and children and (5) three or more adults and children.
Note that the fourth category contains households with two parents and children
below 15 as well as one-parent families with one of the children being 15 years
or older. In Table 115 of EUROSTAT  (1996b), the activity rates by household
< type are summarized. These give the number of household members in the labor
force divided by the total number of adults within the household type, for each
household type.
We obtain the benefits distribution over individuals by using the information
of the two tables mentioned above. First, we multiply the number of households
in each household type by the size of each type. This gives the number of indi-
viduals with a given household type. Note that we have to split up the second
category mentioned above, since this category represents both two-adult house-
holds and three-or-more-adult households. We use a family size of 3.37 in the
case of a household of size three or more. It turns out that the sensitivity of
the estimation results with respect to this assumption is small. The constructed
benefits distribution does not change very much even if we use a value of 5 or
6. Secondly, we multiply the numbers of individuals in the different household
types by the corresponding activity rates. This results in a distribution for the
five main household types described above. Now, recall that OECD (1997) only
allows for three household types. We categorize individuals in households with
two or more adults as single. Moreover, we merge the fourth and fifth category
to obtain the category of households with children.
Some of these assignments are rather ad hoc. In the empirical analysis we
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Unempl. Insurance Social Assistance
Single Lone Couple Single Lone Couple
Parent Parent
Benefits level 765 9 4 8 1111 765 1 1 1 0 1265
Table 2: After-tax benefits levels of different household types, in U.S. dollars per
month.
Variable
Single 9 6 8
Lone parent -352
Couple with children 127
Table 3: Gross reservation wages in U.S. dollars per month for the year 1994
perform sensitivity analyses to investigate to what extent the results are sensitive
with respect to this.
As noted in the introduction, we assume that for a given household type,
unemployment income is constant during the spell of unemployment. Here, we
operationalize this by taking the relevant benefit level to be a weighted average
of the two successive benefit levels given in OECD (1997). The weights are the
percentage of unemployed with a duration less than two years and the percentage
with a duration of more than two years. We examine the sensitivity of the results
with respect to this assumption. Figure 3 illustrates the resulting distributions
of b.  The second category (lone mothers) constitutes a small fraction of the
labor force. This could be sensitive to the EUROSTAT  (1996b) classification
of household types, which does not allow for a separation of parents from other
adults. It is possible that a fraction of the household categories (2), (4), and (5)
are actually also one-parent families.
By invoking the relation (1 - Q(&))&  + & = bh, we obtain the distribution of
(gross) reservation wages from the benefits distribution. Table 3 presents this for
the year 1994. The reservation wage for lone parents is negative. This is a direct
result of the Family Credit. By comparing the reservation wages to the minimum
wage (see Table l), it follows that structural unemployment is partly due to high
unemployment benefits (namely, for single living individuals) and partly due to
the minimum wage (namely, for individuals in other household types).
1 9
G e r m a n y
aq , , , , . , . , ,0
I
I -
d I
I*
6 I
France
99 . , . , , , . 1 1
0 I
I - I
d
I
u) Id
I
y?- I u-l I
0 I d
2 I
'5 t I r"_ -+-:, d 5” I
n - I . 0. I
n
6
I n  -
0
I
I
Ic-4
d I
p!  -
0 I
I
I
d I d
I
I
9,  * - I . 0 -  .I, .D,  I .
O  600 8 0 0 1000 1200 1 4 0 0 1 6 0 0 d 600 800 1 0 0 0 1200 1400 1 6 0 0
B e n e f i t s B e n e f i t s
I-
d
40
6
In
d
,x
‘ii  *
E0
0
r)
d
I
600 800
The Netherlands U K
a)
d  . * . ’ I’ . r .
Q .  , , , , , . f
0
I
1
Ir
I d I
I CD
I
d
I ” -
0
I . 3  ’
I -5  w e  r
50
I . n.
I
VI
C i
I I - 4
I d
I
I 5
IImA , , 0 , 1 * D e  , I I I . \
1000 1200 14Qo l b 0 0 d 660 800 1 0 0 0 1200 1400 1 6 0 0
Benefits Benefits
Figure 3: Distribution of benefits levels among different household types for the
year 1994
< 4 The empirical implementation
4.1 The likelihood function
Since we allow for three different benefits levels, we estimate the model of section
2 with M = 3. Recall that we have three sets of endogenous variables. First,
for individuals in the LFS sample who are in the labor force we observe whether
they are unemployed or employed. Secondly, for unemployed individuals in the
LFS sample we observe the elapsed unemployment duration. Thirdly, for individ-
uals in the earnings sample we observe the wage. When deriving the likelihood
function, we interpret the samples as random samples of individuals from the
corresponding populations. The stochastics  that is used to estimate the model
ultimately comes from the randomness of the arrival times of events and the
randomness of the contacts between workers and employers. The distribution of
these sources of randomness is an essential ingredient of the individual’s decision
problem.
Let us examine the distributions of each of the three sets of endogenous vari-
ables. The marginal probability of unemployment is equal to U,  which is obtained
by using equation (12). Hence, whether a randomly chosen individual is unem-
ployed or not is determined by a Bernoulli distribution with this parameter U.
We define Q(t)  as the distribution function of elapsed unemployment dura-
tions in the stock of unemployed, and Q(t) as the corresponding survivor function
Note that Q!  = Qo).  Individuals who are frictionally unemployed have an out-
flow rate given p of JZ(Qp);  h E { 1,. . . , H}. As a result,
mh
’ + r;F(J,b)
1 1; l_tne-‘”  5 mhr(p(;j,))
h=l
The value of Q!  is determined by equation (13). Note that if the benefits dis-
tribution is degenerate, Q(t)  reduces to Q + (1 - a>e-?  In that case, Q!  and X
can be estimated directly from the unemployment duration data. In any case,
the probability that an unemployed individual is in the duration class [&-I,  ti) is
equal to X4!(&) - Xl!(timl)  = ?@iel) -$(ti). These probabilities define the grouped
unemployment duration distribution, which is a multinomial distribution.
By analogy to equation (lo), the distribution of earnings (i.e., cross-sectional
wages) equals
G(w) =
s
G(wlz#r (PIP 2 T,) + r (p(w)IP 2 r,> (16)
PEW-W
The probability that an employed individual has a wage which falls in the earnings
class [wi-i,  WJ  is equal to G(wi)-G( wi-i). These probabilities define the grouped
earnings distribution, which is a multinomial distribution. Note that the use
of grouped data makes our estimation method, to some extent, robust against
outliers in the wage data.
We maximize the following log likelihood function, in notation to be explained
below,
ct
log L =I& log U + Nz log(  1 - u) + x A$  log (Q @i-l)  - G (h))
i=l
(17)
+ 7, N3,i  log  (G  (w)  - G(w-1))
i=l
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where Ct  and C, represent the number of duration and earnings classes, Ni+Nz is
the total number of individuals in the sample for the unemployment rate, with A$
the number of unemployed, and Nl i is the number of unemployed with a duration
in the ith class, so that, obviously, ;\r,  -= C & i. Furthermore, JVs  i is the number3 9
of individuals in the sample for the earnings distribution with earnings in the ith
class. Moreover, the ti)S and wi’s are the threshold values of the duration classes
and earnings classes, respectively, where we use the conventions to = wo = 0
and tc, = WC,  = 00.  The values of Ni,  N2,  and Ni,i can be straightforwardly
calculated from the number of households in the Labor Force Survey, using the
average number of adults per household by household type and the activity rates
by household type. Note that in XP (equation (15)) we integrate with respect to
dl?(plu  = 1).
Of course, vve  have to substitute the structural expressions for F(wIp)  and
G(wIp) into the above expressions. The parameterization  of the productivity
distribution is discussed in the next subsection.
4.2 Choice of the productivity distribution
In our empirical work the distribution of p is chosen to give a good fit to the
< observed wage distribution. First, it should be noted that with a discrete distri-
bution of unemployment income b,  both the wage offer and the earnings distri-
butions will have zero density in an interval below each reservation wage. This
is true irrespective of the choice of the distribution of p. The empirical wage
distribution does not have such gaps. There are two reasons why we think that
this feature of the equilibrium distribution does not invalidate our estimates. The
first reason is that the discrete distribution of b is a discretization of a continu-
ous distribution that we do not observe. In principle, it is possible to generate
such a continuous distribution using a microsimulation model that computes for
every, and not just the unemployed, participant in the labor market his or her
unemployment income. Unfortunately, we do have access to such a model. The
second reason is that we use grouped wage data. In such data the gaps, which
turn out to be small for well-fitting distributions of p, are not visible. As long as
the empirical fractions are fitted, we do not worry too much about the shape of
the wage density within the intervals.
For the value of CG  that is consistent with the duration data, the wage offer
distribution is concentrated near the maximum wage in a submarket. This im-
plies that the right tail of the wage offer and earnings distributions will resemble
the productivity distribution. In figure 1 we give the earnings density for a pro-
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Figure 4: Wage offer and earnings density, using a mixture of log
tributions, f(z) = 7rlogN(/.Ji,a2)  + (1 - X)logN(/J2,02),  A  = 0.07
P1  = 7.7, ~2 =  8.2, 0 = 0.2 and r = 0.9
normal dis-
, 6 = 0.006,
Quantile With dispersion Without dispersion
1010 1309 1315
5Y0 1522 1517
1ool0 1665 1645
20010 1828 1813
3oY0 1958 1945
40% 2079 2065
5oY0 2200 2187
6Oy0 2332 2319
7oY0 2490 2476
8Oy0 2706 2692
9oY0 3111 3095
Table 4: Quantiles of the earnings density with and without benefits dispersion
ductivity distribution that is a mixture of two lognormal distributions. This class
of productivity distributions is able to fit the observed wage data.
In Figure 5 we illustrate the effect of benefits dispersion on the shape of the
earnings density. We choose again a mixture of two lognormals for the distribution
of p.  We consider two cases (i) a three point distribution for b with points of
support 800, 1200 and 1600, and corresponding probabilities 0.25, 0.5 and 0.25,
and (ii) a degenerate distribution of b concentrated in 1200, i.e. the mean of the
three point distribution. The effect of the benefits dispersion is restricted to the
lower tail of the earnings density. This is confirmed by the quantiles of the two
distributions reported in table 4.
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Figure 5: Illustration of the effects of benefits dispersion
4.3 A sampling experiment
In our empirical work, the estimates are based on large data sets. However, the
data are grouped, and the model is a highly nonlinear mixture. To see what
precision we may expect, we perform a sampling experiment. We only report
the results for a single choice of the parameters. The number of observations
is 10000, and the unemployment durations and wage s are grouped in 5 and 18
intervals as in the observed data. The distribution of the reservation wage has
three points of support 600, 1200 and 1700 with probabilities 0.6, 0.2, and 0.2.
The parameters X and 6 are set to 0.07 and 0.006. Furthermore, the pro-
ductivity distribution is a mixture of lognormals with means 7.7 and 8.2, and
common standard deviation 0.2. The minimum wage is not binding, i.e. lower
than the smallest reservation wage. The corresponding values of a, ~ymin  and uf
are equal to 0.1658, 0, and 0.0874.
In table 5, we report the results of 1000 replications. Apart from the parame-
ters pl, JUT  and a, the theoretical standard deviations have quite similar values as
the empirical standard deviations. As can be seen from figure 6, the fitted wage
and duration distributions are are very well predicted.
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Variable Mean value Empirical std. Theoretical Std. dev.
of mean std. dev. std. dev
Parameters of the model
x 0.0703 0.0003 0.0032 0.0034
1-11 7.6949 0.0003 0.1000 0.0035
ru2 8.1960 0 . 0 0 1 7 0.0996 0.0173
0 0.2058 0.0003 0.0023 0.0030
6 0.0060 0.0000 0.0003 0.0003
7r 0.9029 0.0009 0.0067 0.0086
K 11.7533 0.0446 0.3938 0.4458
Decomposition of unemployment
a 0.1833 0.0009 0.1227 0.0092
U f 0.0870 0.0003 0.0027 0.0030
Table 5: Results of the monte carlo  simulation
W a q e
0
3000
wages
Survival
d
0
6
Figure 6: Estimated earnings density and survivor function of the Monte Carlo
simulations
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Variable 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Parameters of the model
A 0.0994
(0.0003)
CL1 7.5093
(0.1440)
i-42 8.1679
(0.1430)
0 0.2914
(0.0062)
6 0.0102
(0.0001)
7r I 0.7197
(0.0275)
K 9.7060
(0.1316)
Decomposition of unemployment
Tot al unemployment 0 . 0 9 7 4
(0.0050)
Str. unempl. by min. wages 0.0004
(0.0010)
Str. unempl. by unempl. ben. 0.0037
(0.0039)
Frictional unemployment 0.0931
(0.0012)
* Standard errors are between parentheses
0.0774
(0.0002)
7.5678
(0.1887)
8.2538
(0.1866)
0.3125
(0.0062)
0.0086
(0.0001)
0.7624
(0.0282)
8.9978
(0.1187)
0.1037
(0.0056)
0.0004
(0.0012)
0.0034
(0.0044)
0 . 0 9 9 7
(0.0012)
0.0709
(0.0002)
7.5789
(0.1820)
8.2620
(0.1800)
0.3147
(0.0067)
0.0073
(0.0001)
0.7561
(0.0300)
9.6753
(0.1318)
0.0972
(0.0052)
0.0004
(0.0011)
0.0033
(0.0040)
0 . 0 9 3 4
(0.0012)
0.0772
(0.0003)
7.5851
(0.2036)
8.2488
(0.2011)
0.3340
(0.0089)
0.0068
(0.0001)
0.7410
(0.0399)
11.3363
(0.~628)
0.0857
(0.0069)
0.0007
(0.0018)
0.0042
(0.0051)
0.0807
(0.0011)
0.0877
(0.0003)
7.5768
(0.2079)
8.2402
(0.2051)
0.3328
(0.0092)
0.0072
(0.0001)
0.7359
(0.0416)
12.2130
(0.1803)
0.0805
(0.0073)
0.0007
(0.0020)
0.0044
(0.0053)
0.0753
(0.0011)
Table 6: Estimation results
5 The results
We estimate the model for 1992-1996. We consider five years to check whether
the parameters are relatively stable over time. The results are summarized in
table 6. It is found that the parameter estimates do not vary too much over the
years.
The parameter estimates can be used to decompose the unemployment rate.
It is found that only about 7% of total unemployment is structural, and that most
of the structural unemployment is due to high reservation wages. The remainder
of total unemployment is due to search frictions.
The fit of the earnings and unemployment duration distributions is reported
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Figure 7: Estimated and observed earnings density and survivor function of the
year 1996
Variable Estimate
Earnings distribution
Mean earnings level 2 1 3 4
Standard deviation 1312
Productivity distribution
Mean productivity level 2 5 5 6
Standard deviation 1058
Table 7: Mean and standard deviation of wage and productivity distribution
in figures 7. Although we do not observe the unemployment duration distribution
by household type, the model predicts that there is a relation between type and
duration. In table 8 we report the fraction unemployed after 12, 24, and 36
months. Single workers are predicted to have longer unemployment durations
than workers in other household types. This effect is only due to the higher
reservation wage of single workers.
A weak point in our empirical analysis is concerned with the assumptions
that were made in obtaining the unemployment benefits distribution. It seems
hard to evaluate the quality of this distribution, but it is possible to analyze the
impact of the different assumptions that were made. For example, we made the
assumption that the relevant benefit level is a weighted average of the social assis-
tance and unemployment insurance levels. However, individuals are expected to
decrease their reservation wages long before the date of unemployment insurance
exhaustion. Additionally, since our model is stationary, there is some space for
2 7
Fkaction
After I2 months
After
” single” ) 0.4828
” lone” ) 0.4336
” couple”) 0.4336
24  months
G( 24 I” single”) 0.2601
I?( 24 I)’ lone”) 0 . 1 9 1 7
XE(24I”couple”) 0 . 1 9 1 7
After 48 months
q4q ” single” ) 0 . 1 2 3 3
T(48I ” lone” ) 0.0442
5;(481 ” couple” ) 0.0442
* Standard errors are between parentheses
Table 8: Fraction unemployed of the different household types after 12, 24 and
48 months
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misspecification in the sense that for structurally unemployed people only the
social assistance level is important. This might change the conclusions that the
minimum wages did not explain any unemployment at all. Therefore, we looked
at the impact of using the social assistance level instead of the weighted average of
both kinds of benefit levels. Our second investigation of sensitivity was concerned
with the distribution of household types. The results of the previous section were
based on the assumption that households with two adults living together obtain
the same benefits as single individuals. This seems to be a rather realistic as-
sumption for the United Kingdom. However, on some grounds one might imagine
that it is better to classify them in the same group as the couples with children
(for example because of future decisions in household composition). As a final
investigation, we looked at the effect of ignoring the group of lone parents in our
analysis. We found that the results do not change very much for all these cases.
6 Policy evaluation
For a sophisticated evaluation of possible changes in policy, it is important to
realize that it is not sufficient to look at measures like total and structural un-
employment only. It is also important to look at the effect of total welfare in the
economy. Eckstein and Wolpin (1990) use a social welfare function to analyze this
effect. Following these authors, we define the macroeconomic welfare function as
follows:
s = m1  SpOPmaxIr1wn)) Pdr (P) + m2  spoPm~{~~ ?w,i,}) Pdrcp)+- -
Note that our welfare function differs from the welfare function of Eckstein
and Wolpin (1990) by the exclusion of the individual non-monetary value of
leisure. On the other hand, together with the welfare function of Eckstein and
Wolpin (MJO), the monetary value of leisure (b) does not appear in our welfare
function. This is valid only in the case that benefits are pure income transfers
between different groups of the populations. If there is a balanced budget and if
the difference in taxes due to the changes in benefits is not raised on wages or is
completely burdened by individuals with high wages, then this is indeed the case.
According to our model, the increase in taxes does not influence the labor market
participation decision for these individuals. We note that our welfare function
measures total production within the economy, which seems to be an objective
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measure of welfare. We also take changes in the budget of the policy maker into
account.
Our first exercises in policy evaluation concern an increase and a decrease
of 10% of all benefits. Note that the effects of an increase and a decrease are
not completely opposite, since it depends on the productivity distribution and
the initial situation. Additionally, we note that a policy evaluation based on
a decrease of benefits is a bit tricky, since it is based on the left tail of the
productivity distribution for which we do not have any data. This means that it
is not possible to observe what individuals would have earned if they would have
been working. Additionally, we are interested in what happens if all reservation
wages are equal to those with the highest reservation wage. In that case, there is
no dispersion of reservation wages anymore. The final policy implementation is
somewhat similar to the third with the only difference that we analyze the case
in which all reservation wages are equal to the average level of the reservation
wage. This means that reservation wage for all individuals is equal to 471 dollars.
The estimate of S  with respect to the original policy is equal to 2542.
From the results of table 9, it is found that the increase of 10% of benefits
resort quite large effects on both structural and total unemployment. A decrease
of all benefits resorts the opposite effects. An increase of all reservation wages
equal to the highest reservation wage is found to have less effects than an overall
increase. Additionally, we find that the costs of such a method are quite high. A
policy change that makes all reservation wages to become equal to the average
level of the reservation wages resorts similar results as a 10% reduction of all
benefits. However, the reduction in the benefits budget is smaller.
As stated in the introduction, we also look at the effects of the present system
of the Family Credit (FC) in the United Kingdom. We do this by looking at
predicted outcomes of our model, when such is system was not present. Table
10 summarizes the results. It is found that the structural unemployment rate is
increased a lot compared to the case where the FC is present, while total unem-
ployment does not increase that much. Additionally, it is found that the costs
of the present system are about 16 dollars per month per inhabitant. Although
these costs are quite high, it is found that they are outweighed by the change in
unemployment benefit payments.
7 Conclusions
This paper analyzes unemployment benefits systems of the United Kingdom. In
particular, we are interested in the effects of benefits and the mandatory mini-
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Variable Estimate
Level of social welfare
10% increase of all unemployment benefits 2543
10% decrease of all unemployment benefits 2545
All benefits equal to highest benefits 2539
All benefits equal to mean benefits 2546
Unemployment level
10% increase of all unemployment benefits 0.1071
10% decrease of all unemployment benefits 0.0962
All benefits equal to highest benefits 0.1024
All benefits equal to mean benefits 0.0947
Structural unemployment level
10% increase of all unemployment benefits 0.1294
10% decrease of all unemployment benefits 0.0287
All benefits equal to highest benefits 0.0939
All benefits equal to mean benefits 0.0116
Change in benefits budget
10% increase of all unemployment benefits 16
10% decrease of all unemployment benefits -12
All benefits equal to highest benefits 45
All benefits equal to mean benefits -5
Table 9: Results of the policy simulations for the year 1994
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Variable Estimate
Level of social welfare 2 5 2 3
Total unemployment level 0.1251
Structural unemployment level 0.2523
Costs of the present EITC 15.7
Increase in outlays for benefits 22.9
Table 10: Results of the EITC policy evaluation
mum wage on structural and frictional unemployment. Our model iS based on an
equilibrium search model which allows for differences in unemployment benefits
as well as productivity levels and job-to-job transitions. We use readily available
aggregate data, ,published  by the OECD (1997) and EUROSTAT  (1996). Our
estimation method is structural and we use a maximum likelihood approach. The
estimated structural parameters are the friction parameters and the parameters
of the aggregate productivity distribution. Different components of the unem-
ployment rate are directly obtained from the parameters.
Data of benefit levels are not available at the aggregate level. Therefore, we
construct this distribution by the calculation of the benefit level conditional on
( the household type and the distribution of individual workers among these differ-
ent household types. Frictional unemployment seems to be insensitive to policy
parameters, but structural unemployment varies substantially across different
policy regimes.
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Appendix. Analytical solution for F(w 1~)
It is possible to derive analytical expressions for the wage offer and earnings
distributions for any given productivity level p.  For convenience, ignore the min-
imum wage. It is useful to distinguish between seven cases (with corresponding
shapes): four in the case w(p>  = &, two in the case g(p) = & and one in
the case g(p) = &. It is not very informative to present the solutions for all
these cases, so we consider just one case. If (&  - a)/(1 - $J$-)  < p <
.mm{ &-rnl~l (ml  +m2)t2  -77dl
l-n1  ’ m2 ? ((3 - G,,":,,)/(1  -
mly-2)},  then the wage offer
distribution is equal to
F(zolP)  =
?(,I-JE)  ifp-(p-t2)mzy2  LW<(~
9(1-J-) if~z~:w<p-s
?(I- J&) -ifp-*<w<&
1 otherwise
Its density function equals
3 5
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Figure 8: Wage offer distribution and density function, given p = 4000, ml = 0.6,
7732 = 0.2, bl = 600, b2 = 1600, b3 = 3000, 7-(w) = 0 , X = 0.04 and 6 = 0.006
f (WIP)  =
0 otherwise
Figure 8 provides a numerical example, displaying F(w  lp) as well as the cor-
responding G(w lp) and their densities.
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